

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9563
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 6162

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT - CAPTION REARRANGED)

EXDIS USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR EARLE'S STATEMENT OF JULY 22, 1977
(SALT TWO - 1298)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR EARLE
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 22, 1977MR MINISTER:

TODAY I WANT TO RETURN TO THE SUBJECT OF MIRV VERIFICATION AND, IN
PARTICULAR, THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE
DEFINITION OF LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED ICBMS AND SLBMS.

IN ITS STATEMENTS OF MAY 31 AND JUNE 17, THE SOVIET DELEGATION PUT
FORTH NEW PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH THE MIRV VERIFICATION ISSUE.
THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION HAS STUDIED THESE PROPOSALS CAREFULLY
AND THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR DELEGATIONS
ON THIS SUBJECT. AS A RESULT OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS, THERE APPEARS
TO BE A COMMON APPROACH TO THIS SUBJECT, NAMELY, THAT THE
IDENTIFICATION OF A LAUNCHER AS A LAUNCHER OF MIRVED ECBMS OR SLBMS
IS A THREE-STEP PROCESS INVOLVING SEPARATE BUT RELATED ASSOCIA-

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TIONS.
THE FIRST STEP IS TO IDENTIFY A MISSILE AS AN ICBM OR SLBM
EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. THE SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT A PARTICULAR
MISSILE WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS AN ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH
MIRVS BASED ON THE ASSOCIATION OF THAT MISSILE WITH MIRVS DURING
THE TESTING PHASE. OTHER MISSILES OF THE SAME TYPE WOULD BE
IDENTIFIED AS ICBMS OR SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS REGARDLESS

OF THEIR ACTUAL PAYLOAD.

BECAUSE OF THE APPARENT SIMILARITY IN APPROACH, THIS PORTION OF THE MIRV VERIFICATION QUESTION HAS BEEN TURNED OVER TO THE DRAFTING GROUP TO FORMULATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE.

THE SECOND STEP IS TO IDENTIFY A PARTICULAR LAUNCHER AS A LAUNCHER OF ICBMS OR SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. THE SIDES AGAIN APPEAR TO BE CLOSE TOGETHER IN THEIR BASIC APPROACHES. FOR INSTANCE, WE AGREE THAT, AS A GENERAL RULE, THE ASSOCIATION OF A PARTICULAR LAUNCHER WITH AN ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS WOULD BE MADE DURING THE TESTING PHASE, ALTHOUGH UNCERTAINTIES REMAIN AS TO WHETHER SUCH ASSOCIATIONS COULD ALSO BE MADE AT OTHER TIMES.

AGAIN, BECAUSE OF THE APPARENT SIMILARITY IN APPROACH THIS PORTION OF THE MIRV VERIFICATION ISSUE HAS BEEN TURNED OVER TO THE DRAFTING GROUP.

THE THIRD STEP IS TO PROVIDE FOR THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN A PARTICULAR LAUNCHER WHICH HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH A MIRVED ICBM OR SLBM AND OTHER LAUNCHERS OF THE SAME TYPE. THE SIDES SEEM TO BE IN AGREEMENT THAT ONCE A PARTICULAR LAUNCHER HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A LAUNCHER OF ICBMS OR SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS THEN ALL LAUNCHERS OF THAT TYPE WILL BE IDENTIFIED AS MIRV LAUNCHERS. FURTHER, IT IS THE UNITED STATES VIEW THAT THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN LAUNCHERS OF THE SAME TYPE AND, PERHAPS
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MORE IMPORTANT, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF LAUNCHERS MUST BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE. IN ITS STATEMENT OF JUNE 17, THE SOVIET DELEGATION STATED THAT ITS PROPOSAL "PROVIDES FOR ESTABLISHING A PRECISE ASSOCIATION, RELIABLY VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, BETWEEN A LAUNCHER OF ONE TYPE AND THE CORRESPONDING SPECIFIC TYPE OF ICBM OR SLBM, EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, FOR THE LAUNCHING OF WHICH SUCH A LAUNCHER HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED." FURTHER, THE SOVIET DELEGATION STATED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS "ENSURE THAT, ON THE BASIS OF USING NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, IT CAN BE DETERMINED WHETHER DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS BELONG TO THAT TYPE OF LAUNCHER WHICH HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR LAUNCHING A CORRESPONDING SPECIFIC TYPE OF ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS."

THESE STATEMENTS WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS COINCIDE WITH THE UNITED STATES VIEW OF HOW THE ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN A PARTICULAR MIRV LAUNCHER AND OTHER LAUNCHERS OF THE SAME TYPE. HOWEVER, IN ITS STATEMENT OF JUNE 17, THE SOVIET DELEGATION ALSO PROPOSED AN AGREED STATEMENT IN WHICH THE ICBM LAUNCHERS IN THE AREAS OF DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE DESCRIBED

AS CONSISTING OF TWO DIFFERENT TYPES. FOR ITS PART THE UNITED STATES HAS REPEATEDLY INDICATED THT IT IS UNABLE TO MAKE SUCH A DISTINCTION. BASED ON ITS NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS ALL OF THE 180 ICBM LAUNCHERS AT DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK TO BE OF ONE TYPE -- THE TYPE WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SS-19 ICBM.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 6162

EXDIS USSALTTWO

MR. MINISTER, BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE MIRV VERIFICATION ISSUE, I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW THE UNITED STATES VIEWS REGARDING LAUNCHER DISTINGUISHABILITY AT DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK.

THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION PREVIOUSLY NOTED THAT, BEGINNING IN THE EARLY 1970S, 60 NEW LAUNCHERS WERE CONSTRUCTED AT DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK. BASED ON OUR OBSERVATIONS, THESE NEW LAUNCHERS WERE BUILT TO ACCOMMODATE THE SS-19 ICBM, BUT THEY APPEARED TO BECOME OPERATIONAL BEFORE THE SS-19 TEST PROGRAM HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. FOR THIS REASON, THE UNITED STATES ASSUMED THAT THESE 60 LAUNCHERS DID NOT CONTAIN MIRVED MISSILES, EVEN THOUGH THEY APPEARED TO BE OF A TYPE THAT HAD BEEN TESTED FOR LAUNCHING THE SS-19. THUS, WHEN THE SOVIET DELEGATION INDICATED SUB-SEQUENTLY THAT ONLY 60 OF THE 180 LAUNCHERS AT DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK CONTAINED MIRVED MISSILES, THIS DECLARATION PRESENTED THE UNITED STATES WITH NEW INFORMATION.

THE UNITED STATES HAS OBSERVED CERTAIN DIFFERENCES AMONG THE LAUNCH SITES AT DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK. THESE DIFFERENCES ARE NOT IN THE LAUNCHERS THEMSELVES, WHICH APPEAR TO BE IDENTICAL, BUT, RATHER, INVOLVE THE PRESENCE OF CERTAIN ANTENNAS IN THE VICINITY OF 60 OF THE 180 LAUNCHERS DEPLOYED

AT THESE AREAS. THESE ANTENNAS ARE LOCATED, NOT IN THE
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VICINITY OF THE NEW LAUNCHERS TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED, BUT IN THE VICINITY OF 60 LAUNCHERS THE CONVERSATION OF WHICH WAS COMPLETED AFTER THE SS-19 TEST PROGRAM HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. ANOTHER GROUP OF 60 CONVERTED LAUNCHERS, ALSO COMPLETED AFTER SS-19 TESTING HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, DOES NOT HAVE THESE ANTENNAS. ACCORDINGLY, IN THE UNITED STATES VIEW, THERE ARE THREE GROUPS OF LAUNCHERS AT DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK: 60 WHICH WERE NEWLY BUILT BEGINNING IN THE EARLY 1970S, AND WHICH DO NOT HAVE ANTENNAS IN THEIR VICINITY; 60 WHICH WERE CONVERTED FROM EXISTING LAUNCHERS, AND WHICH DO NOT HAVE ANTENNAS IN THEIR VICINITY; AND 60 WHICH WERE CONVERTED FROM EXISTING LAUNCHERS, AND WHICH DO HAVE SUCH ANTENNAS.

A REVIEW OF TEST-RANGE ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH LAUNCHERS OF THE TYPE DEPLOYED AT DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK HAS NOT RESOLVED THE PROBLEM OF DISTINGUISHING MIRV FROM NON-MIRV LAUNCHERS IN THESE DEPLOYMENT AREAS. THE UNITED STATES IS AWARE THAT, SINCE MID-1973, ANTENNAS SUCH AS THOSE AT 60 OF THE LAUNCHERS AT DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK HAVE BEEN ADDED IN THE VICINITY OF TEST RANGE LAUNCHERS USED TO LAUNCH SS-19 ICBMS. HOWEVER, WE ARE ALSO AWARE THAT SS-19 ICBMS WERE LAUNCHED FROM THESE TEST RANGE LAUNCHERS BEFORE THESE ANTENNAS WERE INSTALLED. ACCORDINGLY, THE UNITED STATES HAS CONCLUDED THAT THESE ANTENNAS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR LAUNCHING AN SS-19 ICBM AND THEREFORE DO NOT CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE MIRV AND NON-MIRV LAUNCHERS AT DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK.

IN SUMMARY, THE UNITED STATES REMAINS UNABLE TO CONFIRM BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS THAT THE LAUNCHERS AT DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK ARE OF TWO TYPES, AS THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS STATED. BASED ON OUR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO CONSIDER ALL OF THESE LAUNCHERS TO BE OF ONE
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TYPE -- THE TYPE WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SS-19 ICBM, A MISSILE WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREE IS MIRVED.
MR. MINISTER, FOR THE REASONS I HAVE OUTLINED, THE UNITED STATES REMAINS UNCERTAIN HOW, UNDER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, IT CAN BE DETERMINED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WHETHER DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS ARE OF THE SAME TYPE AS A PARTICULAR LAUNCHER WHICH HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR LAUNCHING A CORRESPONDING SPECIFIC TYPE OF ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. I LOOK

FORWARD TO YOUR ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.EARLE

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